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Abstract. Empirical research on the characteristics of environmentally responsive 
companies has focussed on US and Japanese firms. For Europe, which is commonly 
considered as the greenest of the three major markets, similar research is lacking. This 
paper seeks to fill this gap by empirically investigating business and financial 
characteristics, stakeholder pressures and public policies to distinguish companies that have 
implemented the European Eco-Management and Audit System (EMAS) from a unique 
firm-level dataset of European publicly quoted companies. We find that the EMAS 
participation decision is positively influenced by the solvency ratio, the share of non-
current liabilities, the average labour cost and the absolute company size as well as the 
relative size of a company compared to its sector average. The profit margin exerts a 
negative influence. We further find that companies whose headquarters is located in a 
country that actively encourages EMAS have a higher probability of participation.  
 
Key Words: EMAS participation, business and financial characteristics, stakeholder 
pressures, logistic regression 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In response to increasing stakeholder pressure, companies are embracing 
the “corporate social responsibility” concept evermore tightly. Social, 
environmental and sustainability reports are being published at an 
accelerating pace. Participation in voluntary environmental approaches is a 
straightforward manner to show a corporation’s involvement. Within the 
wide scope of voluntary approaches, public voluntary programmes have an 
attractive appeal. In such programmes participating firms agree to standards 
that have been developed by public bodies such as environmental agencies 
(OECD, 1999). Well-known examples include environmental management 
systems (EMS) like the worldwide ISO 14001 standard and the European 
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), programmes developed by 
the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) such as Energy Star, Green 
Lights, and 33/50 and numerous environmental or social product labels. The 
appealing character lies in the fact that the credibility of these programmes 
is guaranteed by the initiators’ public function and the external validation of 
a company’s compliance with the programme. As most programmes allow 
the use of a logo, they are attractive instruments for companies to signal 
their pro-active stance to various stakeholders. Furthermore, some 
programmes provide participants with regulatory relief, subsidies or 
information sharing initiatives.  
Not surprisingly, participation rates are booming for some of these 
initiatives. The number of ISO 14001 certified companies has risen from 
14,106 in December 1999 to 111,162 in five years time (ISO, 2006). 
Participation in EMAS has tripled to 3,389 organisations between 1997 and 
20061. A growth of 127% of the number of fairtrade certified producers has 
                                                 
1http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/documents/articles_en.htm#statistic 
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been experienced between 2001 and 2005 (Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International, 2006). 
The question that emerges, is what causes some firms to pursue a pro-
active strategy by participating in these programs whereas other companies 
seem to prefer a defensive strategy? To answer this question this paper 
examines the characteristics of large publicly quoted European companies 
that have adopted EMAS. EMAS was implemented by Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1836/93 of June 1993 allowing voluntary participation by 
companies in the industrial sector in a community eco-management and 
audit scheme. The regulation was replaced by Regulation No 761/2001 of 
19 March 2001 whereby participation was opened to all sectors of economic 
activity, which enables us to analyse company behaviour in all sectors of 
economic activity and to draw conclusions that are not restricted to only a 
subset of sectors. The scheme provides companies with a means to manage 
their environmental impacts and to improve their overall environmental 
performance. Next to the general requirements of installing an ISO 14001-
like EMS, EMAS places special attention to the following elements: legal 
compliance, improvement of environmental performance, external 
communication and employee involvement. EMAS is considered as the 
standard of environmental excellence and is more stringent and demanding 
than ISO 14001 (e.g. Kollman and Prakash, 2002; Watson and Emery, 
2004). Consequently the number of EMAS registered companies is rather 
small compared to the number of ISO 14001 certified ones. In December 
2005, ISO 14001 outnumbered EMAS by a factor 10 in the EU-15. As such 
it can be argued that the decision to participate in EMAS is taken more 
thoughtfully and hence EMAS provides us with a better indicator of 
environmentally conscious companies. 
The literature on environmentally responsive firms is rather elaborate. A 
wide range of internal characteristics (e.g. capital intensity, size, 
profitability and financial structure) as well as external drivers (e.g. pressure 
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from regulators, consumers, investors and local community) have been 
examined. As a literature survey of Alberini and Segerson (2002) however 
points out, the evidence on many determinants is not conclusive. Our 
research distinguishes itself from previous research in two ways. First is the 
voluntary approach under study: EMAS. Related research focused on ISO 
14001 (Nakamura et al., 2001; Hibiky et al., 2003; Potoski and Prakash 
2005) or on the comprehensiveness of environmental management practices 
implemented (Dasgupta et al., 2000; Khanna and Anton, 2002; Anton et al., 
2004; Cole et al., 2006). As EMAS is perceived as being more demanding 
than ISO 14001, it may present a better picture of environmental 
responsiveness. Next to explaining the adoption of an EMS, a number of 
studies have focussed on the participation decision towards several US 
EPA’s voluntary programmes such as the 33/50 program (Arora and Cason, 
1995 and 1996; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Videras and Alberini, 2000), 
Green Lights (DeCanio and Watkins, 1998; Videras and Alberini, 2000) and 
Waste Wi$e (Videras and Alberini, 2000). King and Lenox (2000) studied 
companies’ participation decision in the Chemical Industry’s Responsible 
Care Program. Finally, Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) examined the 
motivations explaining firms’ formulation of an environmental plan. 
Second, this is the first study on the characteristics of green companies 
that uses a European firm-level dataset. Previous research has focused 
principally on US companies (Arora and Cason, 1995 and 1996; DeCanio 
and Watkins, 1998; Khanna and Damon, 1999; King and Lenox, 2000; 
Videras and Alberini, 2000; Khanna and Anton, 2002; Anton et al., 2004; 
Potoski and Prakash, 2005). Studies on ISO 14001 are mainly based on a 
sample of Japanese companies (Nakamura et al., 2001; Hibiky et al., 2003; 
Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Cole et al., 2006). Henriques and Sadorsky 
(1996) took a sample of Canadian companies and Mexican companies were 
the subjects of the study of Dasgupta et al. (2000).  
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Within the wide range of potential determinants for environmentally 
responsive behaviour, this paper focuses on business and financial 
indicators, stakeholder pressure and public policy. The results indicate that a 
company’s financial structure, profitability, size and average labour cost are 
significant drivers of EMAS registration. Besides the nature of its activities 
and the location of its headquarters influence the likelihood of participation. 
The paper is structured in the following sections. Section two presents 
the data and the model. The hypotheses and variables are discussed in 
section three. Section four presents the estimation results and section five 
concludes. 
 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
This paper merges two firm-level datasets that, as far as we are aware, 
have not previously been combined. The first consists of the list of EMAS 
registered organisations (received from the EMAS helpdesk on the 25th of 
October, 2005). The second, the Amadeus database (Bureau van Dijk 
Electronic Publishing, update 131, August 2005), provides company-level 
data. Amadeus (Analyse Major Databases from European Sources) is a 
comprehensive, pan-European database containing financial information on 
approximately 8 million private and public companies in 38 European 
Countries. Both databases were linked using a companies ISIN 
(International Securities Identification Number) number. The ISIN number 
is a code that uniquely identifies a specific security and is accepted as 
standard by virtually all countries. 
Our sample consists of the companies listed in the Dow Jones STOXX 
600 Monthly Selection list of November 20052. This list registers the largest 
                                                 
2 Available at www.stoxx.com/info/reports/selection2005.html 
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publicly quoted companies from the EU-15, Norway and Switzerland. In 
November 2005 there were 968 companies on this list of which 74 were 
marked as EMAS registered3. From this list, we excluded a number of 
companies. First we eliminated holding companies (Nace Revision 1.1 
codes 7414 and 7415) because we believe their idiosyncratic characteristics 
might distort the results. Second, due to data limitations, we did not include 
companies not covered in Amadeus (especially banks and insurance 
companies) or companies with missing values on some items. Third 
companies with less then 500 employees were eliminated4. This resulted in 
a final sample of 436 observations of which 38 (8,7%) are EMAS 
participants. The number of participants in the total sample (8,7%) is low, 
but in line with some similar research (e.g. Arora and Cason, 1996; King 
and Lenox, 2000; Potoski and Prakash, 2005). As table I in appendix shows, 
the results presented in this paper are not substantially different from the 
results without these sample restrictions.   
The sample consists of large and publicly quoted companies. Due to their 
visibility it is quite plausible to assume that all of them face at least some 
public scrutiny, receive a lot of cover in the financial press and face 
financial analysts who track and evaluate their performance on a daily basis. 
Probably most of these companies have several environmental and/or social 
projects running, publish sustainability reports and have, to some extent, 
implemented environmental management practices. Presumably a rather 
high percentage is ISO 14001 certified. It should be noted that whereas ISO 
14001 and EMAS are generally presented as substitutes, this should not be 
the case. Although there are no official numbers it is safe to assume that a 
number of companies have implemented both standards. In June 1998, close 
                                                 
3 The EMAS helpdesk lists all organisations at facility level. Our sample however consists 
of companies at group level. As such following Nakamura et al. (2001) and Hibiki et al. 
(2003), an organisation was marked as EMAS participant if at least one of its facilities was 
registered. 
4 This was done due to our doubts on the accuracy of these data. 53 companies were lost.  
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to half of the companies that were EMAS-registered also held an ISO 14001 
certificate, while another third intended to go for ISO 14001 certification 
(Hillary, 1998). Moreover, with the revision of the EMAS regulation of 
2001, ISO 14001 is considered as fulfilling the management system element 
of EMAS. This was done with the explicit aim to induce ISO 14001 
certified companies to take an additional effort to become EMAS. As such, 
our analysis might reveal the characteristics identifying those companies 
that have taken the extra step.  
As EMAS is a voluntary scheme, companies’ participation decision will 
follow from a comparison of the monetary and non-monetary costs and 
benefits. Assume that both discounted monetary and non-monetary costs (C) 
and benefits (B) are influenced by the business characteristics (b) of the 
firm, the financial characteristics (f) as well as stakeholder pressure and 
public policy (s), i.e. C = C(b,f,s) and B = B(b,f,s). One would expect that a 
firm would implement EMAS if the profits (P) from doing so are positive, 
i.e. if  P(b,f,s) = B(b,f,s)-C(b,f,s) >0. However, a company’s net benefit 
from EMAS implementation is not directly observed. We only observe the 
participation decision. However, if we assume that for all EMAS registered 
companies discounted benefits outweigh discounted costs whereas for all 
non-registered companies profits from EMAS implementation are negative, 
we can create a binary choice variable (D(EMAS)) as 
( )
⎩⎨
⎧ >=
otherwise0
0,,if1
)(
sfbP
EMASD ii  
This variable takes the value 1 if the i-th company was EMAS registered on 
October 25, 2005 and we assume that for these companies the discounted 
benefits outweigh the discounted costs whereas the opposite holds for all 
other companies for whom the EMAS variable equals 0 . To examine which 
characteristics are important, we use a binary response model and estimate  
 [ ] ( )P EMAS xβ= = Λ1  
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where  is either the cumulative logistic function (logit model) or normal 
distribution function (probit model), 
Λ
β  is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated and x  are the characteristics of the firm influencing the costs and 
benefits of EMAS and hence, the decision to implement it.  
 
3. DETERMINANTS OF ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIVE 
COMPANIES 
 
In this section we outline our main hypotheses and define the related 
independent variables. The European scope of the sample limits the 
independent variables we were able to include and thus the hypotheses to be 
tested. Next to Amadeus, the availability of comparable company-level data 
in Europe is limited. As such, although it would be interesting to test 
hypotheses on export ratio, R&D, advertising intensity… data limitations 
imply this is beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore comparability 
problems hinder the use of data from national sources like a company’s 
compliance record with environmental regulations. Finally the almost non-
existence of comparable firm-level environmental performance data in 
Europe hinders testing whether EMAS participants prove superior 
environmental performance. 
We found inspiration for the majority of our independent variables in the 
literature. We used averages over a 7-year period (1998-2004) to measure 
most of the variables. Over 90% of all EMAS registered companies 
implemented EMAS in this period. A 7-year average was not relevant for 
the sector and country dummies and not available for the number of 
shareholders and subsidiaries. For these variables we used data of 2004. In a 
perfect world one would take the data from year(s) preceding a company’s 
registration to EMAS. However, this might also create a bias as the 
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implementation time differs considerably between companies. Based on 140 
EMAS sites in 12 Member States, Hillary (1998) found it takes some 
companies over two years while others get registered within 6 months. 
Moreover one would need to make artificial chooses about the year(s) to 
select for the variables of companies that have not (yet) implemented 
EMAS. Finally 7-year averages might help to control for business cycle 
fluctuations that could influence some variables.  
 
Business characteristics 
 
Companies with a high number of facilities will face more difficulties in 
coordinating and monitoring all individual plants. As such the number of 
subsidiaries might be a determinant of the need for standardisation of a 
company’s environmental policy and operating procedures. An EMS serves 
as an instrument to structure the inflow of information and to monitor the 
implementation of the corporation’s policy. A higher number of subsidiaries 
also serves as a proxy for the visibility of the company. Finally, companies 
with a larger number of facilities have a greater likelihood of participation 
since a company was considered a participant if at least one of its facilities 
volunteered to join. The variable (SUBSIDIARIES) measures the number of 
subsidiaries in 2004. The number of subsidiaries was previously examined 
by Arora and Cason (1996) and Dasgupta et al. (2000).  
It is commonly hypothesised that size of a company positively influences 
the participation decision. Possible explanations include the following. First 
larger companies are more visible and face greater scrutiny from various 
stakeholders (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Videras and Alberini, 2000; 
Cole et al., 2006). However, since all the firms in this analysis are publicly 
quoted and face scrutiny in the financial press, this reason might not be as 
important in our analysis. Second the key role of management is to ensure 
coordination of all actions of the many individuals and subgroups in the 
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organisation. Larger companies face higher coordination costs, as there are 
more people and activities to coordinate. As such the need for formal 
structures and procedures to ensure that all employees are focussing their 
efforts towards the goals set by the management rises (Henriques and 
Sadorky, 1996). An EMS might serve as an instrument to reduce these 
coordination costs. Third large companies presumably have more financial 
and intellectual resources and experience with management standards like 
ISO 9001 (Nakamura et al., 2001; Hibiki et al., 2003; Cole et al., 2006). 
Here, we measure company size in 2 different ways. First, we use the 
average number of employees in the period 1998-2004 (EMPLOYEES). 
Secondly, we also created an additional size-variable (RELATIVE SIZE) 
that grasps the relative size of a company compared to the sector average. 
To do this we divided the number of employees of a specific company by 
the average number of all employees in all companies in the same 4 digit 
NACE category in the sample. As such this variable compares the size of 
the company to that of its sector-competitors.  
Next we hypothesise that the higher the average labour costs of a 
company, the more likely it is to have implemented EMAS. Higher average 
labour costs might represent a higher educated workforce or might refer to 
rather unsafe working conditions (e.g. higher wages in the nuclear or 
chemical sector). If higher educated people have a higher environmental 
awareness, as well the educated workforce as the unsafe working conditions 
explanation imply higher incentives to exert pressure on top management 
for safe working conditions and pollution abatement efforts. Moreover a 
highly skilled workforce will make it easier to implement a complex 
management system as they are generally more trainable, adaptable, and 
less resistant to change. We took the average costs of employees and 
averaged it over the years 1998-2004. We will denote this variable with  
“LABOUR COST”.  
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A measure for capital intensity was included under the premise that 
capital-intensive companies have more complex production technologies; 
require more energy and raw materials input and hence have higher 
emission levels (Cole et al., 2006). This induces the need for mechanisms to 
control these complex and highly polluting processes and in turn provides 
greater opportunities and scope for the introduction of clean technologies. 
The variable (CAPITAL INTENSITY) is measured by the ratio fixed assets 
per employee. Again the average over the years 1998-2004 is taken. 
 
Table 1 Sector dummies 
Dummy NACE Description Number of 
companies 
EMAS 
Sector A C 
D 
F 
 Mining and quarrying 
 Manufacturing 
 Construction 
16 
160 
32 
2 
21 
0 
Sector B E  Electricity, gas and water supply 25 10 
Sector C G 
 
 
H 
I 
 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 
 Hotels and restaurants 
 Transport, storage and communication 
51 
 
 
13 
50 
0 
 
 
1 
1 
Sector D J 
K 
 Financial intermediation 
 Real estate, renting and business 
activities 
15 
56 
0 
2 
Sector E O  Other community, social and personal 
service activities 
18 1 
Note: For the other NACE classes there were no companies in the sample 
 
Finally, industry sector dummies are included to take into account 
industry-specific characteristics (e.g. Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; 
Videras and Alberini, 2000; Hibiki et al., 2003). As such industry-wide 
differences with respect to, for instance, pollution intensity, regulatory 
burden and public concern are controlled for. Also, it controls for the 
differences with respect to the possibility to implement EMAS. As already 
noted, some firms were only able to implement it after the revision in 2001. 
A company’s activity was grouped based on the NACE classification 
Revision 1.1 and grouped into five industry dummies (SECTOR) shown in 
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table 1. In our empirical test, the mining and quarrying, manufacturing and 
construction sector (sector A) is the omitted dummy.  
 
Financial characteristics 
 
Implementing an EMS can be considered as a voluntary investment in an 
intangible asset, which is more likely to occur in companies with a sound 
financial structure (Videras and Alberini, 2000). It should be noted that the 
primal objective of an EMS is not to increase short-term profits. In fact, the 
opposite might be the case. The costs are immediate but the benefits are 
uncertain and might only materialise in the long run.  
First we include the profit margin as a measure for a company’s 
profitability. More profitable companies are supposed to have easy access to 
the funds, by retained profits or capital markets (Nakamura et al., 2001). 
The variable (PROFITABILITY) is measured by the average profit margin, 
defined as profit before taxation on turnover, over the period 1998-2004. 
Second we include the solvency ratio (SOLVENCY) and expect a positive 
sign. The solvency ratio is calculated as shareholders funds on total assets 
and we use averages over 1998-2004.  
 
Stakeholders and public policy 
 
Within the wide range of stakeholders, shareholders and creditors may be 
important groups requesting the company to adopt a certified EMS. Both 
may require an EMS as a guarantee of good management in general and 
environmental risk minimization in particular to safeguard their invested 
funds. We hypothesize that the higher the number of shareholders the more 
pressure they will exert. Small shareholders have less influence on and 
knowledge about the company’s operations and strategy compared to major 
shareholders. As a result they have more interest in external verification of 
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good management to minimize the risk of future environmental liability. 
The variable (SHAREHOLDERS) reports the number of shareholders in 
2004. A shareholder is reported if he holds at least 1% of the shares.  
The pressure that emanates from creditors is measured by the average of 
the ratio of non-current liabilities on total liabilities over the period 1998-
2004 (NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES). The variable only reflects the 
interests of long-term creditors, as we believe short-term creditors do not 
have an incentive to push the company’s policy towards immediate costs for 
long-term objectives.  
Finally, we include the country in which the company’s headquarters is 
located. EMAS participation rates differ significantly form country to 
country. The national government’s policy is supposed to play pivotal role 
in this regard by e.g. facilitating access to information, granting support 
funds, shaping attractive public procurement guidelines (e.g. Perkins and 
Neumayer, 2004; Delmas, 2002; Kollman and Prakash, 2002). The variable 
is created as dummy variable (COUNRTY) that takes the value 1 if a 
company’s headquarters is located in Member State that actively encourages 
EMAS registration. The classification is based on the number of incentives 
(regulatory flexibility, public procurement, support funding and technical 
assistance/information support measures) for registered organisations 
provided by each country as reported by the European Commission (2004). 
For companies in Germany (17 measures), Italy (15), Spain (13) and Austria 
(12) the variable takes the value 1. All other countries in the sample have 
eight or less incentive measures and are considered as less supportive.  
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics on the variables and suggests 
that EMAS registered companies have a higher number of subsidiaries, 
more employees, are big compared to their average sector size and, to a 
lesser extent, have a higher number of shareholders and a larger share of 
non-current liabilities compared to non-registered companies Also the 
location of the companies headquarters and sector dummies B, C and D 
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seem to play a distinctive role. Table 5 in appendix shows that our variables 
are not too correlated. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations)  
Variable Unit Total 
sample 
EMAS 
companies
Non-EMAS 
companies 
Business characteristics 
 
Subsidiaries 
 
Employees 
 
Relative size 
 
Labour cost 
 
Capital intensity 
 
Financial characteristics 
 
Profitability 
 
Solvency 
 
Stakeholders and public 
policy 
 
Shareholders 
 
Non-current liabilities 
 
Country 
 
Sector dummies 
 
Sector A 
 
Sector B 
 
Sector C 
 
Sector D 
 
Sector E 
 
 
 
Number  
 
Number *1000 
 
Ratio 
 
Thousand euro 
 
Million euro 
 
 
 
Percentage 
 
Percentage 
 
 
 
 
Number 
 
Percentage 
 
Dummy 
 
 
 
Dummy 
 
Dummy 
 
Dummy 
 
Dummy 
 
Dummy 
 
 
72.99 
(121.1) 
25.49 
(52.12) 
1.085 
(1.06) 
44.68 
(20.67) 
0.47 
(1,57) 
 
 
8.89 
(10.29) 
38.63 
(17.72) 
 
 
 
15.70 
(18.94) 
43.74 
(20.66) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
 
 
0.48 
(0.50) 
0.05 
(0.23) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
 
 
156.05 
(265.30) 
63.66 
(102.68) 
1.914 
(1.46) 
51.51 
(13.41) 
0.54 
(0.71) 
 
 
8.83 
(8.19) 
39.12 
(11.77) 
 
 
 
19.42 
(22.09) 
56.61 
(15.01) 
0.53 
(0.51) 
 
 
0.61 
(0.50) 
0.26 
(0.45) 
0.05 
(0.23) 
0.05 
(0.23) 
0.03 
(0.26) 
 
 
65.06 
(93.68) 
21.84 
(42.91) 
1.006 
(0.98) 
44.03 
(21.13) 
0.46 
(1.63) 
 
 
8.90 
(10.48) 
38.58 
(18.20) 
 
 
 
15.35 
(18.60) 
42.51 
(20.72) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
 
 
0.46 
(0.50) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
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4. RESULTS 
 
The first column of table 3 presents the parameter estimates for the logit 
model. The corresponding probability values are presented between 
parentheses. As a robustness check, the last column shows the probit results. 
The results of both estimations are in line. In the following we concentrate 
on the logit model. The goodness of fit measure count R², defined as the 
percentage correctly classified observations with the estimated equation is 
92.43%. Due to the low number of EMAS registered companies in the 
sample, this is however only slightly above the percentage estimated with a 
constant probability measured by simply dividing the number of non-
certified companies by the total sample number (91.28%). The McFadden 
R² value is 0.34 and as the likelihood ratio statistic equals 87.67, the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is rejected at the 1% significance 
level. However it should be noted that in binary regressand models the 
goodness of fit is of secondary importance. The sign of the coefficients and 
their significance is what matters (Gujarati, 2003). This especially holds for 
the research question at hand.  
The second column shows (for the logit model) the change in odds ratio 
due to an increase in the independent variable by one unit. For instance, the 
coefficient for the variable employees equals 0.0092. The corresponding 
odds ratio (e0.0092) is 1.0092. Then we may say that when the independent 
variable increases one unit, the odds that the dependent equals 1 increase by 
a factor of 1.0092, when other variables are controlled for. The closer the 
odds ratio is to 1, the less influence the independent variable exerts on the 
dependent variable. Equally one can say that when the variable employees 
increase by one unit (1000 employees) the odds of being EMAS registered 
increases by 0.92%. The third column shows the percent increase in the  
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Table 3 Logit estimation results for EMAS certification 
Variable Logit 
estimation 
Percent 
increase in 
odds 
Percent 
increase in 
probability 
Probit 
estimation 
Business characteristics 
Subsidiaries 
 
Employees 
 
Relative size 
 
Labour cost 
 
Capital intensity 
 
Financial characteristics 
Profitability 
 
Solvency 
 
Stakeholders and public 
policy 
Shareholders 
 
Non-current liabilities 
 
Country 
 
Sector dummies 
Sector B 
 
Sector C 
 
Sector D 
 
Sector E 
 
Constant 
 
 
N 
Log-likelihood 
Rest. log-likelihood 
LR statistic (14)  
Prob. (LR statistic) 
% correctly classified 
McFadden R² 
 
0.0002 
(0.9005) 
0.0092** 
(0.0219) 
0.4820*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0270** 
(0.0108) 
-0.0078 
(0.9734) 
 
-0.0432* 
(0.0587) 
0.0376** 
(0.0228) 
 
 
0.0062 
(0.4339) 
0.0341** 
(0.0107) 
0.7267* 
(0.0990) 
 
1.6637*** 
(0.0048) 
-2.6096*** 
(0.0066) 
-2.4951** 
(0.0137) 
-0.4496 
(0.6826) 
-7.4391*** 
(0.0000) 
 
436 
-85.1787 
-129.0158 
85.6744*** 
(0.0000) 
92.43% 
0.3398 
 
0.020 
 
0.928 
 
61.938 
 
2.733 
 
-0.78 
 
 
-4.224 
 
3.830 
 
 
 
0.626 
 
3.469 
 
106.829 
 
 
427.862 
 
-92.634 
 
-91.752 
 
-36.210 
 
 
 
0.002 
 
0.074 
 
4.675 
 
0.217 
 
-0.062 
 
 
-0.337 
 
0.304 
 
 
 
0.050 
 
0.275 
 
7.775 
 
 
24.795 
 
-8.018 
 
-7.934 
 
-2.975 
 
0.0003 
(0.7012) 
0.0042* 
(0.0523) 
0.2467*** 
(0.0052) 
0.0122** 
(0.0243) 
-0.0118 
(0.9155) 
 
-0.0193* 
(0.0920) 
0.0175** 
(0.0353) 
 
 
0.0033 
(0.4426) 
0.0157** 
(0.0162) 
0.4491* 
(0.0531) 
 
0.9469*** 
(0.0037) 
-1.0831*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.9916** 
(0.0255) 
-0.2604 
(0.6342) 
-3.7660*** 
(0.0000) 
 
436 
-86.4427 
-129.0158 
85.1463*** 
(0.0000) 
92.43 
0.3299 
* , ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively  
Note. Probability values are shown in parentheses. LR statistic is a chi-square test 
for all slope coefficients jointly equal to zero.  
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probability of being certified for a one-unit increase in the independent 
variable, controlling for the other variables in the model.  
Next we turn to the significance of the variables. The number of 
subsidiaries, the capital intensity5, number of shareholders and one sector 
dummy are not significant. The insignificance of the number of subsidiaries 
corresponds with Arora and Cason (1996) but contradicts with Dasgupta et 
al. (2000) who found that being a multi-plant company was the most 
influential variable. Whereas the theoretical arguments for the capital 
intensity variable were appealing, our unexpected result is also found by 
Cole et al. (2006). In their paper, for some measures of a company’s 
environmental awareness it even turned out significantly negative. Note 
however that three sector dummy variables are significant. These dummies 
may partly capture differences in capital intensiveness among companies. 
Compared to the mining and quarrying, manufacturing and construction 
sector (sector A), companies involved in electricity, gas or water supply 
(sector B) are more frequently registered. Companies in the services sectors 
C (trade, hotels, restaurants, logistics and communication) and D (financial 
intermediation, real estate and business activities) participate significantly 
less frequent in EMAS. Notwithstanding this finding was expected as on 
average manufacturing companies face higher environmental risks, it should 
be taken in account that is was only in April 2001 when the renewed EMAS 
scheme was implemented that companies in the service sector were allowed 
to participate. Finally, other community, social and personal service 
activities (sector E) have no significantly different participation rates 
compared to the mining, quarrying, manufacturing and construction sector. 
The size of a company, measured by the number of employees, is 
significant at the 5% level. Controlling for the absolute number of 
employees, the relative size of a company compared to its sector average 
                                                 
5 Taking total assets per employee yields similar results. 
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turns out positive and significant at 1%6. These results confirm the 
expectation that larger companies are more likely to have implemented 
EMAS even when controlling for the number of facilities.   
Labour cost’s influence on the probability of EMAS implementation is 
positive and highly significant. This implies that companies with highly 
skilled workforce or with unsafe working conditions have a higher 
probability of having implemented EMAS. This corresponds to some extent 
with Dasgupta et al.’s (2000) finding that companies in which a higher 
proportion of employees followed postsecondary education have 
significantly more comprehensive EMS.  
When looking at the financial variables, it turns out that the profitability 
measure is significant at the 10% level, but has a negative coefficient. When 
we use alternative measures of profitability such as the return on 
shareholder funds or the return on total assets, these alternative variables 
turn out negative but insignificant.7 Again this is in contrast with our a 
priori expectations, but consistent with the diverging results of related 
research. On the one hand, Cole et al. (2006) found a negative influence 
whereas Hibiki et al. (2003) found it to be positive. In the results of De 
Canio and Watkins (1998), Arora and Cason (1995) and Nakamura et al. 
(2001) profits do not seem to have a significant influence on a company’s 
environmental responsiveness. This leads to conclude that profit levels do 
not seem to exert a decisive (positive) impact on this issue. A possible 
explanation for the negative coefficient may be that the need to differentiate 
from competitors is higher in more competitive markets where profit 
margins are generally rather moderate.  
                                                 
6 When the absolute and relative size of a company are measured based on turnover, the 
corresponding coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% respectively 10% level. 
However in this case the labour cost variable and the country dummy variable lose their 
significance. 
7 These results are available upon request from the authors. 
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The coefficient of the solvency ratio is positive and significant. 
Furthermore, the higher the share of non-current liabilities the higher the 
probability a company is EMAS registered. Both confirm that a solid 
financial structure on the long term is favourable for implementing EMAS. 
The positive sign of non-current liabilities may also point to the pressure 
exerted from long-term creditors for the company to demonstrate that it 
minimises its (environmental) risks. While the number of shareholders was 
positive but not significant, the non-current liabilities are. This seems to 
suggest that pressure from external stakeholders is especially relevant for 
those who provide long-term debt. With respect to debt variables, the results 
reported in the literature are mixed. The debt ratio turns out negative and 
significant in Nakamura et al. (2001) and Cole et al. (2006) but insignificant 
in Arora and Cason (1995), DeCanio and Watkins (1998) and Hibiki et al. 
(2003). These diverging results may partly be explained by a difference in 
the way debt is measured. Is debt exclusively measured by current or non-
current liabilities or as the aggregate of both? Our analysis turns out debt 
diminishes the likelihood of participation in EMAS but that especially the 
current liabilities exert a strong negative influence whereas the non-current 
liabilities on the other hand invoke a positive pressure8.  
Finally, a stimulating government policy, as reflected by the country 
dummy variable, provokes a positive and significant influence. Companies 
whose headquarters is located in Germany, Italy, Spain or Austria seem to 
get higher incentives to register.  
 
 
                                                 
8 When we take the debt ratio, defined as the current and non-current liabilities on total 
assets, the coefficient is negative and significant at 5%. This points out that debt as such has 
a negative influence, but when controlled for the solvency ratio, the impact of current 
liabilities (on total assets) is negative whereas non-current liabilities (on total assets) is not.   
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5.CONCLUSIONS 
 
Responding proactively to growing environmental pressure is becoming 
a widespread trend among companies. It goes without saying that the level 
of commitment however is uneven ranging from environmental leaders to 
defensive companies. Empirical research on the characteristics of 
environmentally responsive companies has focussed almost exclusively on 
US and Japanese firms. For Europe, which is commonly considered as the 
greenest of the three major developed economic markets, similar research is 
lacking. This paper seeks to contribute by empirically investigating the 
business and financial characteristics, stakeholder pressure and public 
policies distinguishing companies that have implemented EMAS. A logistic 
regression analysis was carried out on a sample of 436 European companies 
listed on the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 selection list. Our results indicate that 
the solvency ratio, the share of non-current liabilities, the average labour 
cost and the company size positively influence the participation decision. 
Next to the absolute company size, the relative size of a company compared 
to its sector average increases the likelihood of participation. The 
profitability on the other hand exerts a negative influence. Also, the location 
of a company’s headquarters and the industrial sector determine the 
likelihood of EMAS participation.  
Overall, our conclusions are in line with related findings from research 
carried out in the US and Japan. Although evidence is still limited, this 
might point to a rather moderate influence of the institutional context when 
it comes to distinguishing the characteristics of environmentally leading 
companies. The literature on the geographical diffusion of EMS on the other 
hand points to the decisive role of institutional-related aspects to explain the 
diverging adoption rates between countries. Linking these two findings 
might be a challenging task for future research.  
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Another issue that calls for further exploration is the question whether the 
adoption of voluntary initiatives makes companies outperform others on 
environmental abatement. Clear signals of added value above business-as-
usual assessments are required to justify that many voluntary initiatives 
provide benefits for participants in the form of decreased regulatory 
pressure, subsidies or positive publicity. Increasing the amount of and 
reliability of environmental information is crucial to enhance transparency 
and enable public monitoring efforts. The Toxic Release Inventory in the 
US is a forerunner in this regard en has enabled this kind of research. For 
now, the findings do not permit an incontestable answer. Unfortunately, 
comparable firm level environmental performance data is lacking in Europe. 
A database on firm level CO2-emissions created in the wake of the recent 
emission-trading directive on greenhouse gas emissions might provide us 
with a promising indicator in this regard.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 4 Sensivity analysis 
Variable Full sample without 
holdings (logit) 
Full sample with holding 
companies (logit) 
Business characteristics 
Subsidiaries 
 
Employees 
 
Relative size 
 
Labour cost 
 
Capital intensity 
 
Financial characteristics 
Profitability 
 
Solvency 
 
Stakeholders and public policy 
Shareholders 
 
Non-current liabilities 
 
Country 
 
Sector dummies 
Sector B 
 
Sector C 
 
Sector D 
 
Sector E 
 
Constant 
 
N 
Log-likelihood 
Restricted log-likelihood 
LR statistic (14) 
Probability (LR statistic) 
% correctly classified 
McFadden R² 
 
0.0004 
(0.8133) 
0.0083** 
(0.0345) 
0.5216*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0239** 
(0.0297) 
-0.2119 
(0.4053) 
 
-0.0207 
(0.2250) 
0.0326** 
(0.0492) 
 
0.0060 
(0.4545) 
0.0353*** 
(0.0066) 
0.713 
(0.1040) 
 
1.7000*** 
(0.0044) 
-2.3863** 
(0.0106) 
-2.5564** 
(0.0132) 
-0.3254 
(0.7656) 
-7.3489 
(0.0000) 
 
474 
-86.9751 
-132.3320 
90.7138*** 
(0.0000) 
93.04 
0.3428 
 
0.0008 
(0.5543) 
0.0061* 
(0.0637) 
0.2599** 
(0.0352) 
0.0159** 
(0.0458) 
-0.3915* 
(0.0876) 
 
-0.0185 
(0.1867) 
0.0242** 
(0.0354) 
 
0.0035 
(0.6705) 
0.0435*** 
(0.0000) 
0.4041 
(0.2464) 
 
1.6468*** 
(0.0025) 
-2.1831*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.2344 
(0.5285) 
-0.3829 
(0.7234) 
-6.4704*** 
(0.0000) 
 
628 
-142.0931 
-186.4544 
88.7225*** 
(0.0000) 
91.56 
0.2379 
* , ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively  
Note. Probability values are shown in parentheses. LR statistic is a chi-square test 
for all slope coefficients jointly equal to zero.  
Table 5 Correlation Matrix 
 
 EMAS Subsidiaries Employees Relative 
size 
Labour cost Capital 
intensity 
Profitability Solvency Share-
holders 
Non-current 
liabilities 
EMAS 
Subsidiaries 
Employees 
Relative Size 
Labour Cost 
Capital intensity 
Profitability 
Solvency 
Shareholders 
Non-current liabilities 
 1.00 
 0.21 
 0.23 
 0.24 
 0.10 
 0.01 
-0.00 
 0.01 
 0.06 
 0.19 
 
 1.00 
 0.54 
 0.30 
 0.05 
-0.05 
-0.10 
-0.13 
 0.02 
 0.05 
 
 
 1.00 
 0.42 
-0.12 
-0.09 
-0.10 
-0.18 
-0.05 
 0.13  
 
 
 
 1.00 
 0.00 
-0.02 
-0.09 
-0.17 
 0.03 
 0.07  
 
 
 
 
 1.00 
 0.16 
 0.11 
 0.02 
-0.07 
-0.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 1.00 
 0.33 
 0.11 
 0.02 
 0.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1.00 
 0.23 
 0.06 
 0.14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
-0.03 
-0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1.00 
 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1.00 
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